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JURISDICTION
The parties agree that this Court has appellate jurisdiction over this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(j).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellee has not challenged the standard of review set forth in Appellant's
opening brief on the five issues stated therein. Appellee has also not challenged
Appellant's assertion that the issues before this Court are issues of law concerning
the interpretation of certified court dockets, Utah statutes, unambiguous loan
documents, and the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
REPLY TO STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Of the five issues presented in Appellant's opening brief, Appellee now
concedes the second issue which asserts that Horbach's petition for certiorari was
indeed timely filed with the Utah Supreme Court before the 30-day period for the
filing of such a petition had expired.
STATUTES AND RULES
The statutes and Riles which the parties assert to be important or controlling
are Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (appellate jurisdiction), Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 (the
judgment lien statute) and Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
(remittitur) (both the 1995 and present versions thereof).

1

REPLY TO STATEMENT OF FACTS
In its opening brief, Appellant sets forth thirty-five paragraphs of facts, which
Appellee has not challenged. Conversely, Appellee sets forth fourteen paragraphs of
facts in its brief and Appellant responds to paragraphs 2 and 6 as follows.
Concerning paragraph 2, Appellant disagrees with Appellee's suggestion that
the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals was intended to be a self-executing order
which vacated the District Court's Judgment. (Appellee's Brief, Statement of Facts,
paragraph 2.) Rather, on October 19, 1995, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its
written opinion which mandates, in relevant part, as follows:
Because we conclude the trial court erred when it held the accord and
satisfaction unenforceable for lack of consideration and because we
conclude the agreement was not founded upon a mutual mistake of fact,
we reverse and remand for further action consistent with this
opinion,
England v. Horbach et al, 905 P.2d 301, 305 (Utah Ct App. 1995) (emphasis
added)(.see Appellant's Exhibit G (5), page 6). Appellant asserts that the foregoing
language is clear, unambiguous and not subject to reasonable dispute that the Court
of Appeals remanded the case for further action by the District Court consistent with
its opinion.
Concerning paragraph 6, Appellant does not dispute that the Court of Appeals
issued a remittitur to the District Court on November 22, 1995. However, on
November 20, 1995, two days before such remittitur, the Utah Supreme Court sent

?

formal written notice to the District Court that a petition for certiorari had been filed
with the Utah Supreme Court by Mr. Horbach. (See Supreme Court Docket, Exhibit
G (3), page 1.) The foregoing notice was entered on the District Court's docket on
November 20, 1995. (See Certified District Court Docket, Exhibit G (1), page 18.)
The notice gave notice to anyone searching the judgment docket that the Judgment
was subject to further review by this Court. (A copy of the foregoing notice is
attached as Appellant's Exhibit G (6).) This Court granted the petition for certiorari
and filed a formal notice with the District Court that certiorari had been granted
several months before the trust deed, from which Appellee's interest arose, was
recorded against the judgment debtor's property. (Compare Certified District Court
Docket, Exhibit G (1), page 18, to the dates on trust deed at Appellant's Exhibit G
(8)).
REPLY - POINT I
HORBACH'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WAS TIMELY FILED
Appellant has demonstrated that the District Court's Memorandum Decision
incorrectly concluded that Horbach (i.e., the judgment creditor) filed his petition for
certiorari on November 24, 1995, after "the Court of Appeals remitted the case back
to the District Court." This Court's certified docket reflects that Horbach filed his
petition for certiorari with this Court on November 20, 2001, which was before the
30-day period for the filing of such petitions expired, and before the clerk of the
Court of Appeals attempted to remit the appellate record to the District Court.
3

In response, Appellee concedes now for the first time, that Horbach's petition
for certiorari was indeed timely filed. Appellee argues, however, that the District
Court's error is without effect. Appellant disagrees. Appellant asserts that Judge
Henriod's decision was based, in part, on the premise that jurisdiction over the
Judgment re-vested with the District Court because Horbach's petition for certiorari
was not filed within the 30-day period provided by the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
This is evidenced by the District Court's ruling which provides in relevant part as
follows:
In this case, on October 19, 1995, the Court of Appeals issued a
decision reversing and remanding the District Court's Order. Then, on
November 22,1995, more than thirty days after, the Court of
Appeals remitted the case back to the District Court. Shortly
thereafter, on November 24,1995, defendant filed a petition for
certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court.
Based upon this sequence of events defendant contends that
after remittitur the District Court did not obtain proper
jurisdiction and consequently could [not] modify its judgment in
accordance with the instructions of the Court of Appeals,
However, defendant's petition for certiorari was only granted after
the Court of Appeals sent the case back to the District Court and
after the thirty-day waiting period had expired . . .
Memorandum Decision, Exhibit H, page 2 (emphasis added). Based upon the
foregoing language, there is little doubt that the District Court concluded that the
petition for certiorari was filed after, the thirty-day period had expired. Indeed, the
District Court's conclusion that the petition for writ of certiorari was not timely filed
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was a primary basis for its decision that the opinion of the Court of Appeals became
operative before this Court had completed its review of the Judgment.
Appellant also disagrees with Appellee's argument that the mere fact that the
petition for certiorari was timely filed does not affect this Court's appellate
jurisdiction. Had the petition for certiorari not been timely filed, this Court would
have been without appellate jurisdiction to review the Judgment. However, because
the petition for certiorari was timely filed, this Court acquired appellate jurisdiction
to review the appropriateness of the Judgment made and entered by the District Court
and the opinion of the Court of Appeals relating thereto.
REPLY-POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDINGS
AND CONCLUSIONS ARE ERRONEOUS
A.

APPELLEE'S INTERPRETATION OF RULE 36 IS INACCURATE

Appellee's interpretation of Rule 36 is inaccurate for the following reasons.
First, the interpretation is inconsistent with this Court's controlling case authority in
Hi-Country Estates Home-Owners Association v. Foothills Water Co., 942 P.2d 305
(Utah 1996) and White v. State of Utah, 795 P.2d 648 (Utah 1990).
Second, Appellee's interpretation of the law is contrary to the subsequent
clarifications made to Rule 36 by this Court. Third, the interpretation is contrary to
Utah R. App. P. 1(d), which provides that the Rules of Appellate Procedure shall not
be construed to extend or limit jurisdiction in such a fashion.
5

In support of one of its arguments, Appellee argues that its interpretation of
Rule 36 must be correct because the Rule provides that "[t]he time for issuance of the
remittitur may be stayed, enlarged or shortened by order the Court." However,
Appellee's argument is unpersuasive because the same identical language is found in
Rule 36 in its present form even though subsection (b) of the Rule has been amended
by this Court to clarify that remittitur is automatically stayed when a petition for
certiorari is timely filed. See Utah R. App. P. 36(a)(3).
B.

THE RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE CANNOT BE
CONSTRUED TO EXTEND OR LIMIT APPELLATE
JURISDICTION

Appellee argues throughout much of its brief that the Court of Appeals'
opinion operated to vacate the District Court's Judgment because the record on
appeal was remitted under Rule 36. Again, this argument contradicts this Court's
holdings in Hi-Country and White\ wherein this Court has held that it is well settled
in Utah that the trial court is divested of jurisdiction over a case while it is under
advisement on appeal. Appellee's argument is also inconsistent with the Rules of
Appellate Procedure which provide "[tjhese rules shall not be constructed to extend
or limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals as established by
law" (emphasis added). Utah R. App P. 1(d).
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Appellee misconstrues Rule 36 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure (despite the subsequent clarifications which have been
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made to Rule 36), and oddly suggests that somehow the District Court's Judgment
was vacated even though the District Court never regained jurisdiction over the
Judgment until the appeal process was completed. Again, the Court of Appeals'
opinion remanded the case with instructions. The opinion does not provide that it
would become effective through a remittitur of the record but rather, it remanded the
case with instructions.
This Court's unequivocal pronouncement of the law is that a trial court is
divested of jurisdiction over a judgment while the judgment is under advisement on
appeal. See Hi-Country Estates Home-Owners Association v. Foothills Water Co.,
942 P.2d 305 (Utah 1996); Accord, White v. State of Utah, 795 P.2d 648 (Utah 1990)
("This court has long followed the general rule that the trial court is divested of
jurisdiction over a case while it is under advisement on appeal.")
Appellant attempts to distinguish Hi-Country from the case at bar by
suggesting that the holding in Hi-Country is based and contingent upon the Court of
Appeals' (1) prematurely issued remittitur of the record to the District Court; and (2)
the failure to grant Foothill's request for a stay of the remittitur. [Brief of Appellee at
14-15.] Although this Court apparently considered these issues as additional error
committed by the Court of Appeals, this Court did not hold that a premature
remittitur and/or a failure by a party to request a stay of the remittitur are necessary
prerequisites before a district court is divested of jurisdiction on appeal. Indeed, all
7

that is needed to divest a district court of jurisdiction over a case is a pending appeal
in the Court of Appeals or the Utah Supreme Court. Id. at 307, Again, the current
version of Rule 36 reflects and harmonizes with this Court's decisions in Hi-Country
and White.1
In contrast, Appellee's interpretation of the language in Rule 36 would be
inconsistent with this Court's holdings in Hi-Countiy and White, and Utah R. App P.
1(d). However, if Rule 36 (prior to its amendment) is interpreted as Appellant
suggests, the Rule harmonizes with the foregoing controlling case law on appellate
jurisdiction, the provisions of Utah R. App P . 1(d), and the subsequent amendments
made to Rule 36.
In one of its arguments, Appellant argues non sequitur that if Rule 36 was
amended to conform to the law pronounced in High-County and White, then why do
these cases not discuss the amendments to Rule 36. Obviously, if Rule 36 was
amended to be in harmony with this Court's prior decisions, the subsequent
amendments would not have been discussed in those decisions, which were prior in
time. In contrast, Appellee gives no explanation why Rule 36 was amended by this
Court to harmonize with controlling law. Notwithstanding, even if there were a
conflict between Rule 36 and this Court's case authority on the issue of appellate

The current version of Rule 36 states in relevant part: "If a petition for writ of certiorari is
timely filed, issuance of the remittitur by the Court of Appeals will automatically be stayed
until the Supreme Court's disposition on the petition for writ of certiorari."
8

jurisdiction pending appeal, the later would control because the Rules are not to be
construed to extend or limit jurisdiction. See Utah R. App. P. 1(d).
The case authority cited by Appellant is inapplicable for a number reasons.
The decision of Owens v. Hewell, 474 S.E.2d 740 (Ga. App. 1996), deals with 28
U.S. § 2101(f), which Congress enacted in connection with petitions for certiorari
filed with the United States Supreme Court. While the case is irrelevant to this case,
the case and statute cited therein support Appellant's argument. Indeed, the statute
indicates that it is dealing with a stay of the execution, i.e., the enforcement of an
affirmative judgment. In addition, the decision provides that in the Eighth Circuit a
lower court's judgment is stayed automatically when a petition for certiorari has been
granted.
In Wheeler v. Goulart, 623 A.2d 1177 (D.C. App. 1993), the court found that
"jurisdiction had re-vested in the trial court" on a judgment wherein a reporter had
been found in contempt. However, the matter was settled before the appeal was
addressed by the reviewing court. Thereafter, the reporter sought to have the
decision of the trial court vacated, but the reviewing court would not allow the
vacation of the order of contempt entered against the reporter. The case is factually
distinguishable from the present case. More importantly, the case is irrelevant
because it involves different statutes, rules and procedures than those in Utah.
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In the In re Estate of Harold Grabow, 392 N.E.2d 980 (111. App. Ct. 1979), the
court was addressing the interpretation of the specific rules of the supreme court of
Illinois, which provided that mandates are immediately enforceable under its rules.
There are no similar rules in Utah. The case merely demonstrates that different
states have different rules on the issue of appellate jurisdiction.
In Blum v. Coldwell, 446 U.S. 1311 (1980), the United States Supreme Court
denied the petitioners' request for a stay pending appeal. The Court denied a stay of
the injunctive relief ordered by the United States District Court, as affirmed by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which enjoined the commissioner of New York
from denying social service benefits to certain applicants. The Court denied the
motion for stay because it determined that it was highly unlikely that a petition for
certiorari would be granted and because Congress was considering legislation to
amend the act in question. The case has no applicability to the case at bar in which
certiorari was filed and granted with respect to the Judgment before the debtor
encumbered his property with a trust deed.
Finally, Bulmash v. Davis, 24 Cal.3d 691, 597 P.2d 469 (1979), is easily
distinguished from the present case because the rules and procedures in California are
distinct from those adopted by this Court and the State of Utah. Moreover, the
judgment in that case, which had to be recorded like a deed in order to create a lien,
had been vacated on the county records and there was no notice on those records that
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an appeal had been filed. Thus, the buyer lacked knowledge that there may have
been a potential judgment lien against the property. The court also found that the
buyer did not have actual or constructive notice that the vacated judgment had been
appealed. In Utah, a judgment lien does not arise from the recording of the judgment
on the county records but rather from the entry of the judgment on the District Court
docket. As such, those dealing with the debtor's property would have had notice that
the Judgment remained on the docket and that a petition for certiorari had been filed
and granted by the Utah Supreme Court. In addition, the buyers in Bulmash did not
buy from a foreclosure sale wherein no warranty of title was given by the trustee. 2
C.

REMITTITUR DOES NOT CONTROL JURISDICTION

Even if a record on appeal is remitted by the Court of Appeals to the District
Court, the remittitur does not control the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. Once
this Court has undertaken appellate jurisdiction over a judgment on appeal, neither
the Court of Appeals nor the District Court can divest this Court of its appellate
jurisdiction. Again, in Hi-Country this Court stated: "[T]he Court of Appeals erred
in remitting the case before the time to seek certiorari had expired under the rules and
erred again when it refused to recall its erroneously issued remittitur. The judgment
of the district court is void because that court had no jurisdiction to enter a judgment

" Appellee's interest came through a trustee's deed which gave no warranty of title to the
subject property. (See Appellant's Exhibit G(l 1)).
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while the case was still pending in the appellate courts. The district court judgment is
vacated as void." See Hi-Country Estates, 942 P.2d at 307. Surely, this Court's
decision would have been the same had the clerk of the Court of Appeals improperly
remitted the record to the District Court after a timely petition for certiorari had been
filed with this Court.
D.

HORBACH'S JUDGMENT LIEN AROSE BY OPERATION OF
LAW

Appellee's argument that Horbach should have obtained a stay of execution
pending appeal is illogical and disconnected. Horbach's judgment lien arose by
operation of law pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1, and not by a writ of
execution. A writ of execution under Rule 69 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is
the procedure by which a judgment lien is foreclosed by the sheriff. Thus, a stay of
execution would have only delayed the foreclosure of the judgment lien and would
have had no effect on the validity of the lien.
Similarly, the posting of security is generally required when a judgment debtor
seeks to stay the enforcement of a judgment against him pending appeal. In the
present case, Horbach was the judgment creditor, not the judgment debtor. As such,
there was no need for Horbach to post security before seeking further review of the
opinion made by the Court of Appeals. Indeed, because Utah law provides that a
district court is divested of jurisdiction over a judgment until the entire appellate
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process is completed, there was no reason for Horbach, as the judgment creditor, to
obtain a stay of remittitur as long as he timely filed his petition for certiorari.
Nevertheless, Appellee argues that the Appellant could have protected itself
easier than Appellee by obtaining a stay of remittitur. Appellant disagrees for several
reasons. First, the Utah Constitution and the Utah Judicial Code, rather than the rule
on remittitur, control the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. Second, controlling
case law provides that the District Court was divested of jurisdiction over the
Judgment until the entire appellate process had been concluded. Third, the decision
of the Court of Appeals does not provide that it is to be self-executing upon its entry;
rather, it provides that it was remanding the case to the District Court for further
action consistent therewith. Obviously, if the opinion was self-executing, no such
mandate would have been given. Fourth, the District did not vacate or alter its
Judgment, which remained in the judgment docket, because the Judgment was still
subject to review by this Court. Finally, because the Judgment remained in the
judgment docket pending appeal, the trust deed taken against the judgment debtor's
property thereafter was subject to the judgment lien, which was prior in time.
REPLY POINT III
HORBACH'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WAS
GRANTED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT LONG BEFORE
THE DEED OF TRUST WAS RECORDED AGAINST THE PROPERTY
A comparison of this Court's docketing statement granting certiorari on
February 13, 1996 (see Appellant's Exhibit G(3) at 1), with the date on the lender's
13

trust deed made on May 24, 1996 and recorded on May 31, 1996, conclusively
establishes that the trust deed was made and recorded against judgment debtor's
property after certiorari had been granted by this Court, and all arguments made to
the contrary are unfounded.
Appellant argued in its opening brief that Horbach 5s petition for certiorari was
indeed filed and granted by this Court long before the trust deed was recorded against
the property, In response, Appellee now concedes that the Horbach petition was not
only filed but granted before the trust deed was recorded against the property.
Appellee also does not contend that the trust deed was taken without notice of
the Judgment or that it obtained priority over Appellant's Judgment as a good faith
purchaser for value without notice pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Recording
Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-103 et seq.
Contrary to Appellee's argument, Appellant is not arguing that the granting of
Horbach's petition for certiorari by this Court constituted the reversal of the Court of
Appeals' decision, but rather that the filing and granting of the petition for certiorari
by this Court divested the District Court of jurisdiction over the Judgment until this
Court had completed its review of the Judgment. This is particularly true in a case
such as this one where this Court was reviewing a decision made by the Court of
Appeals pursuant to the pour-over provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2, which
provides, in relevant, part as follows:
14

(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of
the matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate
jurisdiction, except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory
order of a court of record involving a charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers; J
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or
denying a petition for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of
Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall review those cases
certified to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b).
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j), (4) & (5)(emphasis added). There is nothing in the
foregoing statute which provides that the trial court is re-vested with jurisdiction in a
case when this Court has undertaken to review a decision by the Utah Court of
Appeals in the event the record on appeal is sent to the district court.
In sum, there is simply no question that the Utah Legislature has given this
Court the sole and exclusive discretion of reviewing decisions of the Court of
Appeals in civil cases of this nature, and that this Court had the power to hold in Hi-

3

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 provides that "[t]he Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: . . . (i) cases transferred to the Court of
Appeals from the Supreme Court." (Id.)
15

Country and White, that jurisdiction does not re-vest in the district court until the
appeal pending before this Court has been concluded.
REPLY - POINT IV
APPELLANT'S JUDGMENT LIEN IS SUPERIOR
AND SENIOR TO ANY INTEREST ARISING UNDER
THE JUNIOR TRUST DEED
A.

THIS CASE DOES NOT INVOLVE A RENEWAL JUDGMENT
BUT A JUDGMENT THAT WAS AFFIRMED AND REINSTATED
ON APPEAL

In its opening brief Appellant argued that the District Court erred by citing to
Cox v. Corp. v. Vertin, 754 P.2d 938 (Utah 1988) and concluding that because a
judgment lien which arises from a new or renewed judgment does not relate back to
the date of entry of the original judgment, a lien arising from a reinstated judgment
must also lose its priority.
In response, Appellee argues that even if Cox is distinguishable, a judgment
lien ceases to exist when the underlying judgment expires. However, unlike Cox, the
life of the present Judgment did not expire and Appellant is not asserting a judgment
lien without an underlying Judgment. Rather, Appellant asserts that its judgment lien
arose from the time its Judgment was entered by the District Court in the judgment
docket. Moreover, because the Judgment has never been expunged from the
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judgment docket, it retained its priority based on the date of its original entry when
the Judgment was reinstated by this Court on appeal. 4
The cases cited by Appellee are inapplicable and easily distinguished for the
several reasons. First and most importantly, this Court's appellate jurisdiction is
established in part by the Constitution of Utah, Art. VIII, § 3 which provides in
relevant part that:
The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over all other
matters to be exercised as provided by statute, and power to issue all
writs and orders necessary for the exercise of the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction or the complete determination of any cause.
Id. Based upon the power conferred upon it in the foregoing section and the
discretionary power given to this Court by the Utah legislature, pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78-2-2(5), this Court had the power to hold in Hi-Country and White that
when this Court undertakes review of a judgment, the trial court is divested of
jurisdiction until this Court has completed its determination of the matter.
Appellee's reliance on Timm v. Dewsmip, 921 P.2d 1381, 1393 (Utah 1996) is
misplaced for several reasons. First, in the decision this Court noted that the lis
pendens, which had been filed on the records of the county recorder, had been
released and that the buyers were indeed good faith purchasers for value and
therefore entitled to priority under the Utah Recording Act. In the present case,

4

The facts are undisputed, and the District Court docket confirms, that the Judgment has
never been expunged, altered or removed from the District Court's Docket.
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Appellant's Judgment was not expunged or removed from the District Court's
docket. Moreover, because the judgment lien arose from the Judgment, any creditor
who dealt with the property thereafter had notice that the Judgment was on appeal
thereby giving notice of the pending litigation. Therefore, anyone taking an interest
in the property, including Appellee's predecessor-in-interest took that interest subject
to the litigation as explained by this Court in Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 590
P.2d 1244, 1248 (Utah 1979), which is the case cited and relied upon by the Court in
the Timrn decision. In Timm this Court stated:
Even if the property were purchased subsequent to the trial court's
release of the lis pendens, such purchaser may have had actual notice of
the pending litigation. Such purchaser would be in the same position as
one who had constructive notice of the litigation subject to a lis
pendens.
Id. at 1393 (citing Tuft v. Federal Leasing, 657 P.2d 1300, 1302-03 (Utah)). In the
present case, the Judgment remained of record and therefore Appellee's predecessorin-interest took its interest in the subject property with notice of the pending litigation
concerning the Judgment. Thus, this Court's decisions in Timm and Hidden
Meadows both support Appellant's position.
B.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S JUDGMENT REMAINED
UNCHANGED DURING THE APPELLATE PROCESS

Appellee cites to footnote 1 of the Utah Court of Appeals' decision and
concludes that the opinion was a self executing judgment. Appellant disputes
Appellee's argument that the Court of Appeals intended its decision to be self
18

executing. The Court of Appeals' decision it made clear that it was remanding the
case for further action by the District Court. The Court remanded:
Because we conclude the trial court erred when it held the accord and
satisfaction unenforceable for lack of consideration and because we
conclude the agreement was not founded upon a mutual mistake of fact,
we reverse and remand for further action consistent with this
opinion.
England v. Horbach et al, 905 P.2d 301 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (see Appellant's
Exhibit G (5), page 6) (emphasis added). The language is simple, clear and not
subject to confusion, that the case was remanded for further action. However, no
further action was taken by District Court because the Judgment was subject to this
Court's judicial review.
The decision mMerhish v. HA. Folsom & Associates, 648 P.2d 731 (Utah
1982), to the extent the case has any applicability, supports Appellant's position. The
case stands for the proposition that when a case on appeal becomes moot, the
appellate court should vacate and remand that the case to the trial court so that the
trial court can enter the appropriate order of dismissal. It does not stand for the
proposition that no remand is necessary.
Appellant's attempts to distinguish Hi-Country are also unpersuasive. The
holding that a trial court is divested of jurisdiction over a case while it is under
advisement on appeal was based, in part, on this Court's holdings in White v. State,
795 P.2d 648 (Utah 1990) and Smith v. Kimball, 76 Utah 350, 289 P. 588 (1930).
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This case is indeed similar to Hi-Country because the Court of Appeals
remitted the record to the trial court even though a petition for certiorari was timely
filed and subsequently granted by this Court. Because the Judgment was under
review on appeal, the files should have been held by the Court of Appeals until this
Court had decided whether to grant the petition for certiorari. Once the petition was
granted, the files should be forwarded to the clerk of this Court. Appellee's
arguments to the contrary are misplaced.
Finally, Appellee is correct in its argument that unlike Hi-Country where the
trial court erroneously took some action, the District Court took no action in the
present case to vacate the Judgment before this Court had completed its review of the
case.
C.

EVEN HAD THE JUDGMENT BEEN VACATED (WHICH IT
WASN'T), THE JUDGMENT WAS REINSTATED BY THE UTAH
SUPREME COURT

Appellee has utterly failed to distinguish this Court's decision in Hewitt v.
General Tire and Rubber Co., 302 P.2d 712 (Utah 1956) from the present case. In
Hewitt this Court explained the effect of a reinstated judgment as follows.
The court's order entering judgment for the defendant was in error and
abortive, and when this court issued its mandate ordering the
judgment for defendant vacated and the judgment on the verdict
for plaintiff reinstated, it vitalized that judgment to the same extent
and with the same force as though the trial court had never entered
the abortive and erroneous judgment for defendant.
Id. at 713 (emphasis added).
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Based upon the foregoing doctrine, when this Court reinstated the
Judgment on appeal, it vitalized the Judgment to the same extent and with the
same force as if the Court of Appeals had never opined that the District Court
erred in making the Judgment. ^
D.

APPELLEE'S PREDECESSOR TOOK ITS SECURITY
INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY SUBJECT TO
APPELLANT'S JUDGMENT LIEN

This Court has previously held that one who obtains an interest in property
"with full knowledge that the property taken is the subject of on-going litigation
acquires only the grantor's interest therein, subject to whatever disposition the court
might make of it." Hidden Meadows Development Company v. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244,
1248 (Utah 1979).
The Hidden Meadows decision deals with whether a lis pendens operates to
give proper notice post-judgment and during an appeal when the plaintiff failed to
obtain a supersedeas bond. Id. In this case, Appellee has argued extensively that
Horbach could have obtained a stay had it obtained a supersedeas bond. [Appellee's
Brief at 16-19] In Hidden Meadows, the Court rejected a similar argument:
Appellants further contend that since plaintiff failed to obtain a
supersedeas bond it was not entitled to a stay of proceeds and that
such failure in some way rendered the notice given by the recorded
lis pendens ineffectual. For two very obvious reasons, that
5

It is also noteworthy that Appellee has not cited any authority in support of its position that
a reinstated judgment does not relate back to its initial entry, when the Judgment remained
on the judgment docket.
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contention is without merit. First, and foremost, the 'failure' to
accomplish any number of imaginable things in no way alters the
inescapable fact that a duly recorded lis pendens serves as notice to
all persons. It is an elementary principle of real estate law that
those who deal in property interests are bound by those matter that
appear of public record and one may not be penalized or deprived
of the effectiveness of such notice as is imparted by the record
simply because of some unrelated action or inaction of his or
others. Such was merely available to him. The fact that none was
flirnished is of no consequence in this case. This is found to be so
when it is observed that the purpose and effect of supersedeas is to
restrain the successful party an the lower court from taking
affirmative action not enforce a judgment or decree.
Id. (emphasis added).
The rationale of the Hidden Meadows case is applicable to the case
at bar. Here, the Judgment Creditor did not have a mere Us pendens
recorded against the property with the county recorder but rather its
Judgment was reflected in the judgment docket. Therefore, any person
interested in taking a security interest in the debtor's property had notice
that the Judgment had been entered against the judgment debtor in Salt
Lake County and that the Judgment was under review by this Court. With
notice of the foregoing Judgment and the associated judgment lien,
Appellee's predecessor was certainly in the position to know whether the
collateral offered by the judgment debtor was adequate to secure
repayment of its loan. Appellee's argument that "there is no authority" for
the proposition that a judgment under review by this Court "provides
constructive notice of an interest in real property" ignores the reality that a
?2

judgment lien arises by operation of law pursuant to Utah Code Ann, 7822-1, and that it is therefore standard practice for all title companies in
Utah to check judgment dockets before insuring an interest in real
property.
CONCLUSION
The ruling made by the District Court in this action is erroneous and contrary
to law for the various reasons set forth in Appellant's opening and reply briefs.
WHEREFORE, Appellant prays the Court to reverse the judgment made by
the District Court and to declare that Appellant's Judgment and the lien which arose
therefrom are valid and enforceable against the subject property from the date the
Judgment was first made and entered on the judgment docket, and that the Sheriff of
Salt Lake County may proceed with the execution sale thereof in compliance with
Rule 69 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
j_V\,

Respectfully submitted this \Q

day of June, 2002.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

Steven W. Call
Attorneys for Appellant
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